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In contemporary global politics different actors seek to create contrasting world orders through the 
existing mechanisms of global deliberation and policy-making. This article draws on the anthropology 
of policy to elucidate some of the different potential world orders that are being discussed today. 
Developing the concept of ‘policy vision’, the article seeks to bring into focus the different policy 
visions currently being proposed by the countries of the North and those of the South in global policy 
negotiations at the United Nations. To do this it critically scrutinizes the divergent North-South 
positions in the negotiations leading up to the 2015 UN Financing for Development conference in 
Addis Abeba and draws out their divergent visions of alternative world orders. The conclusion sets 
these alternative world orders within Dani Rodrik’s ‘political trilemma of the global economy’ and 





1. A forum or working group to discuss the nature of the future world order should be established at 
the United Nations. 
 
2. The G77 should organise a commission to review their view of a desirable future world order in 
light of the contemporary context and should give serious consideration to the possibilities of 
democratic state-society relations at the global level. 
 
3. Civil society should organise wide-ranging consultations on possible future world orders, and feed 
their conclusions into the UN forum or working group suggested above. 
 
4. Ultimately, decision-making about the nature of the future world order should be democratized 







This article is concerned with the way in which different actors seek to create contrasting world orders 
through the currently existing mechanisms of global deliberation and policy-making, and with the 
nature of the different potential world orders that are being proposed. Drawing on the anthropology of 
policy, this article seeks to bring into focus the different world orders that are currently being 
proposed by the countries of the North and those of the South in global policy negotiations at the 
United Nations. Whilst it is well-known that discussions at the UN tend to be marked by contrasting 
positions of the North and the South - as represented by the Northern countries, the EU and the OECD 
on the one hand, and the Southern countries and the G77 on the other - there has been little analysis of 
the content of these positions taken as whole policy visions, and even less consideration of the 




In 2015 three major UN conferences took place – one on Financing for Development in July, one on 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals in September, and one 
on Climate Change in December. The agreements made at these three conferences set out a new 
universal vision regarding sustainable development. Whilst the other conferences set out goals and 
targets, it was at the Financing for Development (FFD) Conference in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia that 
difficult negotiations took place about what kind of activities should be carried out in order to reach 
these goals and how these activities should be funded. It is in these discussions about the so-called 
‘means of implementation’ that it is possible to view the different visions of the future world order 
called for by the North and the South, even while they agreed on the shared goals of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) . This article thus draws on insights from the anthropology of policy to 
critically scrutinize the divergent North-South perspectives in the negotiations leading up to the Addis 
Abeba conference. The next section briefly discusses the anthropology of policy and then develops 
the concept of ‘policy vision’. The following two sections draw out the policy visions of the North 
and the South from the negotiations at the Addis FFD conference, and the conclusion considers the 
implications of the two contrasting policy visions for the future of state, society and market relations 
in the global age. 
 
The Anthropology of Policy 
  
The anthropology of policy has developed since the late 1990s and to date has mainly focused on 
policy processes at the national or European levels. Nonetheless many of the insights can also be 
applied to studies of global policy. Anthropological approaches to policy see policy as inherently 
political and the goal of analysis is to reveal the larger processes of governance, power and social 
change that are shaping the world today. Policies can be used as a lens through which to study 
political transformation and wider shifts in contemporary systems of governance (Shore, 2012; Shore 
& Wright, 2011).  
 
Cris Shore and Susan Wright, two pioneers in the anthropology of policy, suggest that policies should 
be conceptualised as discursive formations through which larger scale processes of social and 
historical change can be mapped (Shore & Wright, 1997). This is because part of the ‘work of policy’ 
is to classify and organise people and ideas in new ways (Shore & Wright, 2011, p3). They argue that 
policies can be thought of as ‘contested narratives’ which frame the problems of the present in such a 
way as to project a particular pathway to their resolution (Shore & Wright, 1997, p3). Thus, to cite an 
example that they give, in the 1960s the Beveridge report about the British National Health Service 
framed the relation between individual and society in a fundamentally new way by tying the welfare 
of every individual into membership of society and setting out a system in which the current 
workforce would underwrite the security of the retired generation while trusting that the future 
generation would do the same for them. In this way the Beveridge Report framed the space to be 
governed in a radically new way and thus set in motion a process of major social change (Shore & 
Wright, 2011, p2).  
 
So whilst policies to some extent mirror the visions and values of society, they can also create 
alternative renditions of that society.  Through the processes of ‘re-defining’, ‘re-organising’ and ‘re-
framing’ policies can provide active charters for change. It is precisely because they possess this 
authority to redefine issues that they are often used by governments and other institutions when they 
seek to act upon the world and to change it  (Shore & Wright, 2011, p3; Stepputat & Larsen, 2015, 
p12). Looking at global public policies from this perspective suggests that we can read these policies 
as visions of, and prescriptions for, the future world order. In other words, when looking at global 
public policy in this way, it is possible to study competing ways in which various parties attempt to 
‘produce the world’ (Bierschenk, 2014).  
 
One way of doing this is to look at what I call the policy vision that is embedded in various policy 
positions, statements and documents. A policy vision is not the same as a policy narrative – it is not 
the explicit story that the policy-makers create in order to explain or justify a particular policy. Rather 
it is the vision of the world that would come about if a particular collection of policies were indeed to 
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be implemented. A policy vision cannot be read from a single policy document in a straightforward 
way. Instead it must be pieced together from considering the implications of different policy 
documents, statements and positions. In this article I seek to piece together the contrasting policy 
visions of the North and the South at a particular UN conference by looking at the assumptions and 
framing of the policy debates that took place during the negotiation process. 
 
 
The 2015 Financing for Development Debates  
 
The preparations for the third Conference on Financing for Development were launched at the United 
Nations in New York on 17 October 2014. Two rounds of discussions reviewing progress made in 
implementing the agreements of the previous FFD conferences in Monterrey (2002) and Doha (2008) 
and discussing new and emerging issues were then followed by drafting sessions which took place 
between January and June 2015. The zero draft was produced after the first drafting session in January 
2015. There were then regional consultations and informal hearings with civil society and the business 
sector. The second drafting session took place 13-17 April and a third drafting session was scheduled 
for 15-19 June. According to observers these negotiations became “heated and tense affairs marked by 
clashing positions between developed and developing countries and deep discontent over both content 
and process” (Muchhala, 2015). Due to difficulties coming to agreement on a range of issues, the 
fairly unusual step was taken to add three additional drafting sessions in between the second and third 
drafting sessions. However even these failed to bring all parties to agreement. By the end of the third 
additional drafting session there were still a number of outstanding issues on which consensus could 
not be achieved. 
 
This led to the co-facilitators circulating a number of ‘bridging proposals’ in an attempt to address the 
differences and the next several weeks were spent convening non-stop informal discussions and small 
private meetings behind closed doors. Three new versions of the draft document were issued during 
the third drafting session, but agreement still could not be reached. The session was paused and 
extended while a number of outstanding issues of ‘great sensitivity’ needed to be discussed at the 
political level (IISD, 2015a). After several more weeks of informal consultations it still proved 
impossible to reach consensus and in the end the outcome document was only finalized at the Addis 
Ababa Conference itself. 
 
The Addis Ababa conference took place between 13-16 July 2015 and was attended by over 11,000 
people, including heads of state, ministers and representatives from governments, civil society and 
business. Throughout the week of the conference the Main Committee met three times in closed 
meetings to try to resolve the final text. The final outstanding issue which was causing all the trouble 
was tax. According to one observer the G77&China representative had revealed to them that the 
developing countries had decided that tax was the most important issue for them, particularly 
upgrading the UN Tax Committee to an intergovernmental body, and that they had taken a strategy to 
focus on getting a substantive outcome on this one matter above all others (IISD, 2015b; Muchhala, 
2015). The developed countries were however very much opposed to any kind of global tax body and 
were determined not to budge on this issue. Hence the deadlock.  
 
The discussions were not very productive and the G77&China finally had to back down and agree to a 
compromise. The final text included some proposals to make minor changes to the UN tax committee 
but fell far short of upgrading it to an inter-governmental body. Why the seemingly unexciting and 
bureaucratic issue of changes to a tax committee at the UN should have become such a contentious 
issue will become clear when we look at the two conflicting policy visions of the North and the South. 
However, tax was of course not the only issue of disagreement. Throughout the negotiations there 
were also major North – South conflicts on a range of issues including the role of the private sector, 
the nature of Official Development Assistance (ODA, or ‘aid’), the principle of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), the integration or separation of climate and development 




In this paper I will argue that in order to understand what was really at stake in these negotiations we 
have to not focus on the minute details of each disagreement, but instead to step back and look at the 
two negotiating positions as whole policy visions. Analysed this way we can see that the North and 
the South were in fact proposing different ways of ‘producing the world’ – they were arguing for 
different world orders.  
 
Based on a review of publically available documents from the drafting sessions, articles and reports 
produced by observers, and interviews with civil society representatives who were present in Addis 
during the conference, this paper seeks to bring into focus the different ‘global policy visions’ of the 
North and the South.  
 
 
The Policy Vision of the South  
 
The world order proposed by the South is one in which separate countries have their own sovereignty 
and make their own decisions about the best policies and approaches to development. These countries 
are then embedded in a loosely connected international order in which, they argue, the rules should be 
democratically decided by all countries and should be based on a relationship of solidarity between 
the rich North and the poor South. This vision is in many respects a continuation of the vision 
encompassed in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which the group tried to push in the 
1970s. 
 
This vision can be seen in the statements made by representatives of the G77&China, the African 
bloc, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) as well as by individual countries of the South. Throughout the negotiations they 
continually stressed the importance of a world order in which independent national governments are 
in charge of the development processes within their countries. In line with this they stressed that it 
was fundamental that governments have enough policy space to make their own decisions about 
national policies. For example, in their comments at the second drafting session, the representative of 
the G77 and China said: 
 
The issue of policy space for national governments must also be respected. Individual 
Member State regulations on public domestic financing must be the prerogative of 
national governments, in accordance with their own specific needs and objectives. (G77 
& China, 2015a, p3) 
 
In line with the vision of sovereign governments in charge of the development processes within their 
own countries the South also placed considerable emphasis on the need for public sector funding and 
they argued repeatedly that “public funding should always take precedence over private financing” 
when it comes to matters of development and poverty reduction (G77 & China 2015c:1). This vision, 
we can see, is what drove their negotiating positions with regard to ODA, to tax, and to debt, which I 
will discuss now. 
 
They argued that ODA is vitally important for developing countries and must remain central to 
development financing. They criticized Northern countries for not meeting the ODA commitments 
that they made at previous Financing for Development conferences and urged them to pledge to 
increase their aid in the coming years. For example in the second drafting session the representative 
for the G77 & China said: 
 
The Group of 77 and China … is of the firm view that ODA represents the major source 
of financing for the development of many developing countries and it must target the 
eradication of poverty in its multiple dimensions (G77 & China, 2015, p3). 
 
They also noted that in recent years the amount of ODA they receive has been decreasing as there has 
been a new trend to channel ODA to humanitarian disasters and to in-country programs in the North, 
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for example to fund refugee assistance. And they further feared that the re-framing of ‘development’ 
as ‘sustainable development’ would mean that the supposedly additional funds promised for climate 
initiatives would in fact be taken from existing ODA budgets. Thus they argued for these different 
things to be delineated and measured clearly. 
 
Above all they argued that ODA is an expression of the ‘partnership of solidarity’ between the North 
and the South and they reiterated the need for a global partnership for development. For example in 
the second drafting session the G77 representative said: 
 
The Group of 77 and China calls upon developed countries to agree and commit to a new 
phase of international cooperation through a strengthened and scaled-up global 
partnership for development, which should be the centrepiece for completing the 
unfinished business of the MDGs and implementing the post-2015 development agenda 
(G77 & China, 2015, pp5-6)  
 
Again and again they stressed that ‘partnership’ means partnership between Northern and Southern 
countries and they further argued that this partnership should be based on the Rio Principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) – a principle that was developed in 1992 in the 
context of the Rio Earth Summit and stipulates that whilst all countries share a common responsibility 
to protect the environment this responsibility is differentiated according to the historical pressure that 
that society has placed on the environment and the technologies and financial resources which they 
command. The countries of the South argued that this principle sets out the balance of universality, 
differentiation and responsibility that previous international agreements had defined and should be 
also applied to the responsibility for sustainable development. Thus at the third drafting session: 
 
The traditional definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA), based on North-
South Cooperation, should be maintained, with a reaffirmation of the fact that ODA 
remains the main source of international financing for development for many developing 
countries. It should be based on quantified and time-bound targets that are consistent 
with, and build upon, MDG-8, the global partnership for development, which must of 
necessity be re-invigorated and strengthened, and in accordance with the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) (G77 & China, 2015b, p1) 
 
As well as ODA they also emphasised that the ability to collect tax revenue is extremely important in 
generating public funds to finance development. A main issue here was the matter of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion, particularly by multinational companies. This was stated clearly for example by the 
representative of the African Group at the first drafting session: 
 
It is vitally important to address tax evasion of transnational companies and domestic 
enterprises… Africa realizes that efforts for curbing illicit financial flows (IFFs) 
transcend national and regional boundaries. (African Group, 2015a, p2) 
 
Since multinational companies are adept at finding ways to avoid paying taxes in developing 
countries by using, or misusing, the loop holes in tax treaties and tax laws, they urgently called for the 
creation of an international tax body at the UN through which all countries can come together and 
democratically decide on how to reform the international tax system to minimize the possibilities for 
tax avoidance and evasion. At present there is a UN Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters. This committee is very small and under-resourced, with just two 
permanent staff and only has non-governmental status. The Southern countries called to upgrade this 
committee into an inter-governmental committee on tax cooperation which could then act as a norm-
setting body on tax matters. In this form it would be able to act as the central forum for all countries to 
come together to discuss and agree on international tax issues and would be the centre point in 
designing a new democratic and just global tax system. For example, during the third drafting session 




There needs to be agreement on the upgrading of the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters and the Statistical Commission to inter-
governmental entities. We have talked about these issues for a long time now, and there is 
a need to address them sooner rather than later (G77 & China, 2015b, p1). 
 
The idea is in fact not a new one. It was initially proposed in the 1990s by Vito Tanzi, then Director of 
Fiscal Affairs at the IMF. It formed one of the recommendations of the Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Financing for Development in 2001 and has been supported in various UN reports and 
statements since then including most recently in the Synthesis Report of the Secretary General on the 
Post-2015 Agenda in 2014 (United Nations, 2014). Civil Society actively pushed for it in the 
preparations for the Monterrey Conference and it even made its way onto the zero draft of the Doha 
Declaration. In Addis, as I have mentioned, it was the largest point of contention between the North 
and the South and was the final issue that caused the negotiations to be extended. 
 
Along with ODA and tax, the South emphasized the importance of sustainable debt restructuring 
mechanisms in order to free up public money to spend on development activities. They called for the 
development of an international system of debt re-structuring as soon as possible. In the words of the 
Moroccan Ambassador, speaking on behalf of the African Group: 
 
We need to establish an international debt resolution mechanism to guarantee, a just and 
equivalent treatment for creditors and debtors. In this regard, we welcome the adoption by 
the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 68/304 “towards the establishment of 
a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes” …  (Africa 
Group, 2015c, p2) 
 
The next part of their vision is that sovereign countries should be part of a fair and democratic 
international system. They often highlighted the unfairness of the present system and how it made 
things very difficult for developing countries. They thus called for an ‘international enabling 
environment’ for development. For example, the representative of G77 & China said in the first 
drafting session: 
 
Developing countries should be supported by an enabling international environment, 
which includes a supportive and just economic and financial international system where 
the rules are fair and pro-development (G77 & China, 2015c, p3) 
 
To bring this about they continued to ask for more democratic and representative global governance 
arrangements such that countries from the South would have an equal voice in intergovernmental 
organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO and the Bank of International Settlements, which 
are today dominated by the countries from the North. They managed to get a whole range of global 
governance reforms into the zero draft  - including a sovereign debt restructuring body, a global health 
fund to bring together existing global health funds, an ad hoc advisory body to review the role of 
multilateral and regional development banks, commodity stabilization funds, increasing developing 
country participation in the Financial Stability Board, and implementing reforms in International 
Financial Institutions – but not one of them made it into the final outcome document (IISD, 2015b).  
 
As is clear, the vision of the South regarding financing for development is very much centred on 
public sector funding. They do, of course, acknowledge that the private sector has a role to play, but 
stress again and again that this is a secondary role and that since companies seek primarily to make 
profit they cannot be relied upon to necessarily bring about positive development outcomes. Thus 
throughout the negotiations they argued that there should be much less emphasis on the private sector. 
Whilst they were keen to attract private capital to their countries their views about the best way to do 




They acknowledged that foreign direct investment was important, but they also stressed that it does 
not necessarily bring about development outcomes and would need to be significantly changed to do 
so. For example in the first drafting session the representative of the African Group said: 
 
It is equally important to highlight that achieving [development outcomes] must include a 
change in the mindset of private investors to ensure that their investment decision making 
is not based on profit only, but must incorporate sustainable development needs (African 
Group, 2015b, p2) 
 
They also called for more regulation of transnational companies and appropriate guidelines for all 
forms of investment. Likewise, whilst they accepted that trade is important for development and could 
provide an engine for growth in developing countries they also noted that: 
 
This will always be elusive to the G77 and China as long as a universal, rule-based, open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system is not agreed upon. This 
should also be one of the key deliverables in the Addis Ababa Outcome Document. (G77 
& China, 2015c, p2) 
 
If we piece these elements together we can see that the global policy vision presented by the South is 
one in which sovereign states decide their own policies whilst being embedded in a loose international 
community which democratically makes a minimum number of global rules. Governments raise 
public funds from taxing business and citizens and use this to provide public services and carry out 
some degree of redistribution. Private capital should be attracted, be encouraged to engage in 
development activities and be properly regulated. In many respects this policy vision is very familiar 
– it is essentially a more just and democratic version of the post-war Bretton Woods system of the 
1960s– with limited economic integration, a thin layer of democratically-decided global rules, state 
sovereignty and national level democracy in which governments can make various choices regarding 
policies and approaches. 
 
 
The Policy Vision of the North  
 
In sharp contrast the Northern countries argued for a completely different way of conceptualizing 
international development and its financing.  They repeatedly argued for a radical paradigm change 
and claimed that the post-2015 development agenda, and the way of financing it, must be something 
completely new. The key elements of this radical new vision, they proposed, were a move away from 
a North-South conceptualization of the world towards a universal vision, the bringing together of 
development and climate issues, and a major new role for the private sector. To give an example of 
the emphasis on changing approaches, here is a quote from the EU representative at the second 
drafting session: 
 
The zero-draft does not fully capture the paradigm shift towards a universal agenda that 
has taken place since Monterrey and that the SDGs will concretely reflect, and remains 
overly premised on an outdated North-South understanding of the world (EU, 2015, p2) 
 
The new vision of the North – pushed by all the Northern countries along with the EU and the OECD 
- is one of development being led by global capital and private investment. The emphasis is very 
much on the private sector. They thus stressed that ODA can only form a tiny part of development 
finance and they were generally not supportive of attempts to help developing countries increase their 
tax collection from multinational companies or to reduce debt burdens beyond the most extreme. 
Their focus was on increasing economic integration with more foreign direct investment and more 
trade. As the UK representative said at the first drafting session: 
 
Working in partnership with the private sector to generate real progress is … at the core 




And again by the EU in the second drafting session: 
 
Ensuring the right form of engagement by the private sector, and incentivising its positive 
contribution to sustainable development, will be one of the key challenges for the 
implementation of the post-2015 agenda (EU, 2015, p3) 
 
In order to manifest this particular agenda the focus of the North was on finding ways to facilitate 
global capital to do business in developing countries. In this view governments need to be responsive 
to the requirements of global capital and do what is necessary to attract it to their countries. For 
example, the US representative said in the first drafting session: 
 
The Addis outcome document must also recognize that capital will naturally flow to 
countries where investors believe they can get a good rate of return and their investments 
will be protected. To attract and enhance inflows of productive capital for maximum 
development impact, countries need to create a transparent, stable and predictable 
investment climate, with proper contract enforcement and respect for property rights (US, 
2015b, p1) 
 
To this aim they emphasised three key issues: a domestic level enabling policy environment, public-
private partnerships and various mechanisms to improve the risk-return ratio for companies.  
 
In the policy vision of the North governments, particularly Southern governments, need to step back 
from leading, and indeed from implementing, and should instead focus on enabling.  The key role of 
governments in their vision was to provide the right policy environment that would enable global 
capital to do business in Southern countries. Throughout the negotiations the North repeated again and 
again the need for an ‘enabling environment’ at national level. Against the calls of the South for 
‘policy space’ the North emphasized the importance of all countries having the right mix of policies 
and regulations that would enable capital to flow across national borders with minimum transaction 
costs and which would focus on guaranteeing property rights, safeguarding investments and reducing 
taxation and regulation. At the second drafting session the EU representative put it this way: 
 
The policy dimension of the document should be strengthened significantly by stressing 
the centrality of stable and enabling environments, sound, effective and coherent policies, 
effective institutions and good governance. Policy coherence by all countries and at all 
levels will be key in moving towards poverty eradication and sustainable development. 
(EU, 2015, p1) 
 
The importance given to this topic can also be seen in the fact that three of the six roundtable 
discussions that took place during the Addis Abeba conference were on the topic of ‘policy coherence 
and enabling environment’, and several side events also focused on this issue. 
 
The ‘right policies’ in this vision are largely policies that have been developed in the North. As well 
as the well-known policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus this includes a range of new 
global policy norms that have recently been developed by the North – in many cases by the OECD – 
to which the policies of Southern governments are expected to conform. Two important examples are 
the tax norms set out in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) guidelines of the OECD and the 
OECD’s Policy Framework for Investment (PFI). In both of these cases supposedly global norms 
were devised by the Northern countries with the expectation that they would be implemented by all. 
These particular policy norms were mentioned frequently in the negotiations, with the BEPS process 
being applauded whenever the South called to move tax negotiations to the UN. In contrast to the 
South’s call for inclusive and democratic rule-making at the global level the policy vision of the North 




Along with an enabling policy environment the North stressed the importance of public-private 
partnerships to facilitate private sector involvement. The US representative set out how he saw the 
respective roles of the public and private sectors in his intervention in the first drafting session: 
 
[Along with finance] the private sector also provides management skills, information 
technology and can connect producers to value-chains. In turn, the public sector supports 
creation of the necessary policy environment and mitigates risk (US, 2015b, p2) 
 
In this vision it is the private sector that should be implementing development activities rather than 
Southern governments, while Southern governments should concentrate on enabling policies and risk 
mitigation. There is a focus on infrastructure, and in particular large scale infrastructure projects. In 
order to incentivize the private sector to invest in this traditionally risky area the North sought ways to 
‘de-risk’ these projects so that their ‘risk-return profile’ would be attractive to investors. They 
proposed finding projects that would generate adequate revenue streams, for example in the form of 
user payments or debt servicing, and then creating a pipeline of such ‘bankable’ projects. They 
proposed that national governments would take on much of the risk of these investments through a 
range of new financial mechanisms. 
 
To this end the North suggested that a good use of ODA would be to finance some of these risk-
reduction mechanisms. Thus alongside general statements that ODA was not the main mechanism to 
finance development and acknowledgements that its levels were declining, the North proposed that 
ODA be made ‘smarter’ by using it to leverage private sector investments through such de-risking 
mechanisms. So for example at the first drafting session the representative of Switzerland said: 
 
ODA will be nowhere near sufficient to finance the ambitious and universal Post-2015 
agenda we are all striving for. Therefore, the Addis Ababa outcome will have to show 
how ODA can be used in a smart way to leverage other sources of financing for 
sustainable development (Switzerland, 2015, p2) 
 
And at the second drafting session the OECD representative reiterated much the same thing: 
 
We are also working on making ODA “smarter” by promoting its strategic use to catalyse 
other sources of funding, including private investment which is a critical resource for 
sustainable development (OECD, 2015b, p2) 
 
Throughout the negotiations there was repeated emphasis on these new forms of ‘blended finance’, 
including guarantees, first loss funding and various mechanisms that blend ODA with private finance. 
For example at the first drafting session the representative of Canada set it out like this: 
 
Innovative financing approaches, including public-private blended finance, represent an 
essential part of the solution to the Financing for Development gaps. Blended finance will 
…  allow us to mobilize additional capital for development by mitigating risk (Canada, 
2015, p1). 
 
Similar thoughts come at the second drafting session from the EU representative: 
 
We would ask the co-facilitators to balance the text on public-private and multi-
stakeholder partnerships and innovative finance including blending, guarantees, equity, 
and other risk-sharing instruments, so as to have a more holistic approach to leveraging 
funding (EU, 2015, p3) 
 
In this new vision ‘partnership’ is not a relationship of solidarity between the governments of the 
North and the South, but instead a business relationship between governments and companies. Thus 
the ‘global partnership for development’ was subtly, but significantly, transformed to ‘multi-
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stakeholder partnerships for development’. For example, at the second drafting session the EU 
representative said: 
 
[W]e believe that the Addis outcome needs to stress the multi-stakeholder character of 
the global partnership, able to mobilise action by all countries and stakeholders at all 
levels (EU, 2015, p3) 
 
And again from the US: 
 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships and blended financing approaches… are gaining currency 
as the new model for support to development and should be welcomed (US, 2015, p2) 
 
In this vision of private sector financed development, the role of Southern governments as providers 
of public services is much diminished. Thus raising public funds is correspondingly less important. 
Only minimal public finance needs to be raised, according to this policy vision, in order to provide 
some basic kind of social protection for the very poorest in these countries. Underlying the policy 
narrative of a ‘global social compact’ in which ‘no-one is left behind’ was a policy vision in which it 
would be the poor who would be paying for the social protection of the poorest. This is because in the 
vision of the North social protection mechanisms would be funded from domestic tax revenues, with a 
focus on collecting taxes from citizens of their own countries. The North adamantly blocked any 
attempts to focus on how developing countries could stop tax avoidance by multinational companies 
or democratize global rule-making regarding taxation and instead focused on initiatives to build the 
capacity of domestic tax administrations to broaden their tax base and collect more taxes from their 
citizens. 
 
Piecing together the elements of this policy vision we can see that the North was trying to use the 
Financing for Development discussions to produce a new conceptualization of the global system by 
re-framing the roles of state, society and market and re-defining previously agreed key concepts such 
as ‘partnership’, ‘aid’ and ‘development’. Their policy vision emphasizes increasing international 
economic integration and stresses the primary role of global capital. In order to facilitate the flow of 
capital across borders governments are called to adhere to global policy norms and must essentially 
follow the same economic approach everywhere, which includes limited regulation and taxation and 
reduced state provision of public services. In this policy vision public funding is of only secondary 
importance and the role of ODA, tax and debt relief are negligible. 
 
 
Conclusion: Whither State, Society and Market in the Global Age? 
 
So what does all this mean for the future of development, inequality and society? What are the 
implications of these two policy visions and the contrasting world orders that they are seeking to bring 
into being? In many respects the North – South debate in the FFD process seems to be very similar to 
right – left political debates that take place at national level. The policy vision of the North is right 
wing neoliberal while that of the South promotes a more left wing vision akin to social democracy. 
But it is more complex than this because within each policy vision there are also contrasting visions 
about the relative importance of the national and the global, and in particular about how states and 
markets should function at these two levels.  
 
One way to pull this into focus is to draw on the work of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, who in 
2000 published a now-classic article in which he proposed that there was what he called a “political 
trilemma of the world economy” (Rodrik, 2000). According to this trilemma it would only ever be 
possible to have at most two out of the following three - international economic integration, the nation 
state and democratic mass politics. So if there were to be more international economic integration 




His reasoning for this startling claim followed from the fact that for international economic 
integration to continue further it would be necessary to find ways to stop national boundaries and 
jurisdictions interfering with global capital flows. Rodrik figured that there were only two ways that 
this could happen. One option would be to harmonise national regulations, tax policies and contract 
enforcement procedures with international standards so that doing business in one country would be 
much the same as doing business in any other country. In this case the role of national governments 
would have to be restricted to creating the right set of policies to attract global capital – to creating an 
enabling environment for business and investment. There would need to be a standardization of tax 
policies and investment policies, and standardised contract enforcement and dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Governments would have to be responsive to global capital and therefore they would 
have to give up on democracy, or at least firmly restrict its remit. In this scenario governments 
wouldn’t be able to have their citizens voting for policy options that did not suit global capital, such as 
high rates of corporate tax or expensive social service provision, to take just a few examples, because 
if they did capital would just go elsewhere. So in order to be able to make the right policies it would 
be necessary to insulate large areas of economic policy making from democratic influence. So in this 
scenario democracy is lost, or at least much reduced. 
 
The other possibility, according to Rodrik, is to scale up democratic politics to the global level and 
create a federal world system. In this model a global government would regulate a global market. It 
could be modelled on the United States of America – so in effect we would have a United States of 
the World – where despite some differences in regulation and taxation practices between states, a 
global government and a federal judiciary would ensure that markets are truly global and are 
regulated, stabilized and legitimized. In this scenario the powers of states would have to be extremely 
circumscribed and most economic policy-making would largely shift upwards to the supranational 
level. Democratic politics would also expand up to this level and it would be at this level that global 
citizens would vote on issues regarding the running of the global economy. Thus federal rates of 
corporate taxation or of social service provision, to continue the examples, would be decided at the 
global level and applied everywhere. So in this option we lose nation states, or at least their power and 
significance would be much restricted. 
 
Rodrik argues that if international economic integration – or globalization – is to continue, we will 
necessarily have to choose one or other of these paths. The only other option is to stop pursuing 
intense international economic integration and instead to facilitate a much looser degree of economic 
integration, perhaps akin to something like the Bretton Woods order of the post-war period. In this 
scenario a moderate degree of economic integration would be accompanied by a thin level of 
international rules which leave plenty of policy space for national governments to decide on their own 
economic approaches and to be responsive to their citizens. In this option it is possible to have both 
states and democratic politics, but not globalization, or at least not much. 
 
Rodrik argues that the world economy is currently “trapped in an uncomfortable zone between the 
three nodes of the trilemma” and that to successfully manage globalization we need to acknowledge 
this situation and choose one of the paths to pursue (Rodrik, 2011, p205). I believe that this was, in 
fact, the discussion that was taking place at the Addis FFD conference. The South were arguing for 
something very similar to Rodriks’s third option of nation state and democracy with only limited 
economic integration, while the North were arguing for something very close to his first option of the 
nation state and more economic integration and therefore less democracy. These outcomes were 
certainly not in their policy narratives, but as I have tried to show, they were in their policy visions. 
 
Seeing the Addis debates in this way helps to shed light on the very different world orders being 
proposed and the huge consequences they have for state, society and market relations in the global 
age. One path leads to de-democratisation, increased inequality and an erosion of the social contract 
that has characterised the post-war period (Freeman, 2017). The other path tries to go backwards to 
the Bretton Woods era and whilst it offers a more attractive picture of democracy and equality it is 




If the South wants to argue for a more social-democratic global order then perhaps they should 
consider Rodrik’s second option - economic integration along with world federation and global 
democracy. In this scenario it would perhaps be possible to have both the benefits of growth and the 
benefits of democracy. A new kind of state-society relation could be forged at the global level in 
which it would be possible to imagine the payment of global taxes and the provision of global public 
goods along with some degree of global redistribution – many of the so-called ‘innovative’ proposals 
that were present in Monterrey and Doha but which were not discussed at all in Addis. This would 
have the potential to lead to reductions in inequality within and between countries, would give 
Southern countries a real chance for development, and could lead to a more just global society. With 
democracy instituted at the global level it would also mean that straightforward left-right debates 
would be able to take place at the global level and they would be able to do so in a much more 
representative manner, in which all citizens are involved in the decision-making and through which 
legal decisions are made by majority vote rather than consensus. Whilst this scenario is not on the 
table for the immediate future, it is perhaps something to be considered for the longer term, as it 
would be a radical, yet familiar, way to reconstitute the global and in so doing to reformulate the 
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